Dealing With US Debt

If you want to watch something alarming, look at the U.S. Debt Clock (http://www.usdebtclock.org/), which calculates, second-by-second, America’s rising debt (approaching $14 trillion), federal spending (nearly $3.5 trillion a year) and budget deficit (roughly $1.3 trillion).  Second-by-second the numbers increase, and you can also watch (more slowly) the inexorable rise in the average debt per U.S. citizen — currently more than $44,000 — perhaps more by the time you read this and check for yourself.

The Debt Clock also lists the largest budget items and THEIR growth, and you can quickly see that they are not where most of the politicians have focused their attention and public statements.  While incoming Congressional leaders talk about ending earmarks and cutting foreign aid, the back-breaking line items on the federal budget are Medicare/Medicaid, Social Security, Defense and war expenditures.  At the bottom of the Debt Clock screen are some truly frightening statistics: add up all the future unfunded liabilities for Social Security, the federal prescription drug program and Medicare liability, and you get a future cost of $111.5 trillion.  That’s a little over $1 million per taxpayer.

Painful Debt Choices

Like any debtor who gets in over his head, the U.S. Congress faces painful choices.  They can either make very difficult decisions now — and possibly alienate voters — or kick the can further down the road and leave a bankrupt country or crushing debt for our children or grandchildren to pay.  The problem is great enough that a coalition of the very rich, including Bill Gates and Warren Buffet, are doing something unheard of: they are publicly arguing that Congress should end the tax cuts for them and others of the wealthiest Americans.

Is there a way to get both political parties talking about the hard choices?  On December 1, a bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, made up of 18 prominent Republican and Democratic leaders, released “The Moment of Truth,” a set of recommendations that would, if enacted, achieve a $4 trillion reduction in government debt.  The group includes the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Budget committees, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, a former White House budget director and a vice chairman of the Federal reserve board.  To achieve their deficit reduction goals, the commissioners put everything on the table — Social Security, Medicare, tax rates, government spending, even the elimination of popular tax deductions.

The Moment of Truth

You can read the full 49-page report here: The Moment of Truth.  The report lists, on page 10, some of the considerations that went into the decisions, which you may or may not agree with: “We all have a patriotic duty to make America better off tomorrow than it is today;” “Don’t disrupt the fragile economic recovery;” “Cut spending we cannot afford — no exceptions;” “Demand productivity and effectiveness from Washington;” “Don’t make promises we can’t keep;” “Keep America sound over the long run.”

The plan would cut government discretionary spending and impose spending caps, including annual limits on war spending, impose 15% reductions in Congressional and White House budgets, a three-year freeze on annual Congressional pay raises, and eliminate all Congressional earmarks (9,000 in FY 2010, costing close to $16 billion).

The commission also recommends lowering tax rates and eliminating many deductions.  There are actually several alternatives in the final proposal (pages 25-27), depending on which deductions are eliminated.  One possible plan is to bring us down to three tax brackets of 12%, 22% and 28% — replacing five brackets ranging from 15% to 39.6% that is due to take effect in 2011.  Corporations would pay at a flat rate somewhere between 23% and 28%, and lose most of their special subsidies and tax loopholes.

To get there, the Commission proposes that Congress eliminate all itemized deductions (everybody would take the standard deduction) and replace today’s mortgage interest deduction with a 12% tax credit for mortgage loans up to $500,000.  Capital gains and dividends would be taxed at ordinary income rates (rather than the preferential rates under current law) and the dreaded AMT would be eliminated altogether.

More controversially, charitable donations, which are currently deductible for itemizers, would only qualify for a 12% tax credit, and only then to the extent that the gift exceeded 2% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.  The Commission also proposed replacing the current melange of retirement plans (Roths, IRAs, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, defined benefit plans etc.) with one type of tax-favored retirement account for everybody; the maximum tax-preferred contribution would be $20,000 or 20% of income, whichever is lower.

The commission proposes to raise the age at which you could receive full Social Security benefits by indexing it to life expectancy.  The Normal Retirement Age, which reaches 67 in 2027, would go up to age 68 by the year 2050, and 69 by 2075.  The Early Retirement Ages, when people could opt for lower annual benefits, would go up to age 63 by 2050 and 64 by 2075.  The taxable maximum wage cap on Social Security taxes, currently $106,800, would grow more rapidly than it has in the past, reaching $190,000 in 2020, versus roughly $168,000 under current law.

Finally, the current federal gas tax would be increased by 15 cents per gallon, a figure which is still significantly lower than most European countries.  Among a variety of Medicare reforms, the Medicare physician payment formula would be changed to reward quality of care and outcomes, rather than the quantity of visits or procedures.  And the government’s civilian workforce would gradually be cut by ten percent.

The Vote

If 14 of the 18 members of the Commission had voted to endorse the recommendations, then the full report would have been sent to Congress for a vote.  As it is, only 11 endorsed their own recommendations.

Endorsing: Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-IL); Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad (D-ND); House Budget Committee Chairman John Spratt (D-SC); former Federal Reserve Board vice chairwoman Alice Rivlin, Republican Senators Tom Coburn (OK); Mike Crapo (ID) and Judd Gregg (NH), plus Ann Fudge of Young & Rubicam, and Dave Cote of Honeywell International.  Co-chairs Erskine Bowles (former Clinton White House Chief of Staff) and former Republican Senator Alan Simpson also voted for the proposal.

Opposed: Senate Finance Committee chair Max Baucus (D-MT); Rep. Xavier Beccera (D-CA); Rep. Jan Schakowski (D-IL); Rep. Dave Camp (R-MI); Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), Rep Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) and Andy Stern of the Service Employees International Union.

Nevertheless, even the dissenting members of the Committee believe it will change the debate in Washington, and focus Congressional attention on the hard choices rather than the easy sound bites.  Let’s hope so for the sake of our children and grandchildren.

Sources:

Market News: http://imarketnews.com/?q=node/23235

Associated Press: Deficit Reduction Committee Issues

Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704594804575648503541856136.html

Tax us more: http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/billionaires-buffett-gates-tax-us/story?id=12259003

Votes pro and con: http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/12/03/1955486/debt-commission-majority-endorses.html

The following is adapted from a lecture given at Hillsdale College on February 2, 2010, during a conference on the New Deal co-sponsored by the Center for Constructive Alternatives and the Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series. A version of this lecture was delivered as the Hayek Prize lecture in 2009.

The Monopoly board game originated during the Great Depression. At first its inventor, Charles Darrow, could not interest manufacturers. Parker Brothers turned the game down, citing “52 design errors.” But Darrow produced his own copies of the game, and Parker Brothers finally bought Monopoly. By 1935, the New York Times was reporting that “leading all other board games … is the season’s craze, ‘Monopoly,’ the game of real estate.”

Most of us are familiar with the object of Monopoly: the accumulation of property on which one places houses and hotels, and from which one receives revenue. Many of us have a favorite token. Perennially popular is the top hat, which symbolizes the sort of wealth to which Americans who work hard can aspire. The top hat is a token that has remained in the game, even while others have changed over the decades.

One’s willingness to play Monopoly depends on a few conditions—for instance, a predictable number of “Pay Income Tax” cards. These cards are manageable when you know in advance the amount of money printed on them and how many of them are in the deck. It helps, too, that there are a limited and predictable number of “Go to Jail” cards. This is what Frank Knight of the University of Chicago would call a knowable risk, as opposed to an uncertainty. Likewise, there must be a limited and predictable number of “Chance” cards. In other words, there has to be some certainty that property rights are secure and that the risks to property are few in number and can be managed.

The bank must be dependable, too. There is a fixed supply of Monopoly money and the bank is supposed to follow the rules of the game, exercising little or no independent discretion. If players sit down at the Monopoly board only to discover a bank that overreaches or is too unpredictable or discretionary, we all know what happens. They will walk away from the board. There is no game.

Relevance to the 1930s

How is this game relevant to the Great Depression? We all know the traditional narrative of that event: The stock market crash generated an economic Katrina. One in four was unemployed in the first few years. It resulted from a combination of monetary, banking, credit, international, and consumer confidence factors. The terrible thing about it was the duration of a high level of unemployment, which averaged in the mid teens for the entire decade.

The second thing we usually learn is that the Depression was mysterious—a problem that only experts with doctorates could solve. That is why FDR’s floating advisory group—Felix Frankfurter, Frances Perkins, George Warren, Marriner Eccles and Adolf Berle, among others—was sometimes known as a Brain Trust. The mystery had something to do with a shortage of money, we are told, and in the end, only a Brain Trust’s tinkering with the money supply saved us. The corollary to this view is that the government knows more than American business does about economics.

Another common presumption is that cleaning up Wall Street and getting rid of white-collar criminals helped the nation recover. A second is that property rights may still have mattered during the 1930s, but that they mattered less than government- created jobs, shoring up home-owners, and getting the money supply right. A third is that American democracy was threatened by the rise of a potential plutocracy, and that the Wagner Act of 1935—which lent federal support to labor unions—was thus necessary and proper. Fourth and finally, the traditional view of the 1930s is that action by the government was good, whereas inaction would have been fatal. The economic crisis mandated any kind of action, no matter how far removed it might be from sound monetary policy. Along these lines the humorist Will Rogers wrote in 1933 that if Franklin Roosevelt had “burned down the capital, we would cheer and say, ‘Well at least we got a fire started, anyhow.’”

To put this official version of the 1930s in terms of the Monopoly board: The American economy was failing because there were too many top hats lording it about on the board, trying to establish a plutocracy, and because there was no bank to government became the bank and pulled America back to economic health.

When you go to research the 1930s, however, you find a different story. It is of course true that the early part of the Depression—the years upon which most economists have focused—was an economic Katrina. And a number of New Deal measures provided lasting benefits for the economy. These include the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the push for free trade led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and the establishment of the modern mortgage format. But the remaining evidence contradicts the official narrative. Overall, it can be said, government prevented recovery. Herbert Hoover was too active, not too passive—as the old stereotypes suggest— while Roosevelt and his New Deal policies impeded recovery as well, especially during the latter half of the decade.

In short, the prolonged Depression can be put down to government arrogance— arrogance that came at the expense of economic common sense, the rule of law, and respect for property rights.

Arrogance and Discretion

Consider the centerpiece of the New Deal’s first 100 days, the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which was in effect an enormous multisector mechanism calibrated to manage the business cycle through industrial codes that, among other things, regulated prices. The principles on which its codes were based appear risible from the perspective of microeconomics and common sense. They included the idea that prices needed to be pushed up to make recovery possible, whereas competition constrained recovery by driving prices down. They held that big firms in industry— those “too big to fail”—were to write codes for all members of their sector, large and small—which naturally worked to the advantage of those larger firms. As for consumer choice, it was deemed inefficient and an inhibitor of recovery. The absurdity of these principles was overlooked, however, because they were put forth by great minds. One member of the Brain Trust, Ray Moley, described the myopic credentialism of his fellow Brain Truster, Felix Frankfurter, in this way:

The problems of economic life were to Frankfurter matters to be settled in a law office, a court room, or around a big labor-management bargaining table . . . . The government was the protagonist. Its agents were its lawyers and commissioners. The antagonists were big corporate lawyers. In the background were misty principals whom Frankfurter never really knew at first hand . . . . These background figures were owners of the corporations, managers, workers and consumers.

One family that was targeted by NRA bureaucrats was the Schechters, who were wholesale chicken butchers in Brooklyn. The NRA code that aimed to regulate what they did was called The Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area in and about the City of New York. And according to this code, the Schechters did all the wrong things. They paid their butchers too little. They charged prices that were too low. They allowed their customers to pick their own chickens. Worst of all, they sold a sick chicken. As a result of these supposed crimes, they were prosecuted.

The prosecution would have been comic if it were not business tragedy. Imagine the court room scene: On one side stands Walter Lyman Rice, a graduate of Harvard Law School, representing the government. On the other stands a small man in the poultry trade, Louis Spatz, who is afraid of going to jail. Spatz tries to defend his actions. But he barely speaks English, and the prosecutor bullies him. Nevertheless, Spatz is now and then able to articulate, in his simple and common-sense way, how business really works.

Prosecution: But you do not claim to be an expert?
Spatz: No.
Prosecution: On the competitive practices in the live poultry industry?
Spatz: I would want to get paid, if I was an expert.
Prosecution: You are not an expert!
Spatz: I am experienced, but not an expert . . . .
Prosecution: You have not studied agricultural economics?
Spatz: No, sir.
Prosecution: Or any sort of economics?
Spatz: No, sir.
Prosecution: What is your education?
Spatz: None; very little.
Prosecution: None at all?
Spatz: Very little.

Then at one point this everyman sort of pulls himself together.

Prosecution: And you would not endeavor to explain economic consequences of competitive practices?
Spatz: In my business I am the best economist.
Prosecution: What is that?
Spatz: In my business I am the best economizer.
Prosecution: You are the best economizer?
Spatz: Yes, without figuring.
Prosecution: I wish to have that word spelled in the minutes, just as he stated it.
Spatz: I do not know how to spell.

This dialogue matters because little businesses like Schechter Poultry are the natural drivers of recovery, and during the Great Depression they weren’t allowed to do that driving. They weren’t allowed to compete and accumulate wealth—or, in terms of Monopoly, to place a house or hotel on their property. Instead they were sidelined. The Schechter brothers ultimately won their case in the Supreme Court in 1935. But the cost of the lawsuits combined with the Depression did not go away.

Regarding monetary policy, it is clear that there wasn’t enough money in the early 1930s. So Roosevelt was not wrong in trying to reflate. But though his general idea was right, the discretionary aspect of his policy was terrifying. As Henry Morgenthau reports in his diaries, prices were set by the president personally. FDR took the U.S. off the gold standard in April 1933, and by summer he was setting the gold price every morning from his bed. Morgenthau reports that at one point the president ordered the gold price up 21 cents. Why 21, Morgenthau asked. Roosevelt replied, because it’s 3 x 7, and three is a lucky number. “If anyone knew how we set the gold price,” wrote Morgenthau in his diary, “they would be frightened.”

Discretionary policies aimed at cleaning up Wall Street were destructive as well. The New Dealers attacked the wealthy as “money changers” and “Princes of Property.” In 1937, after his re-election, Roosevelt delivered an inaugural address an instrument of “unimagined power” which should be used to “fashion a higher order of things.” This caused business to freeze in its tracks. Companies went on what Roosevelt himself resentfully termed a “capital strike.”

These capital strikers mattered because they were even more important to recovery than the Schechters. Consider the case of Alfred Lee Loomis, who had the kind of mind that could contribute significantly to Gross Domestic Product and job creation. During the First World War, he had improved the design of firearms for the U.S. Army. In the 1920s, he became wealthy through his work in investment banking. He moved in a crowd that was developing a new form of utility company that might finally be able to marshal the capital to bring electricity to the American South. But when Loomis saw that the Roosevelt administration was hauling utilities executives down to Washington for hearings, he shut down his business, retreated to his Tudor house, and ran a kind of private think tank for his own benefit. We have heard a lot about a labor surfeit in the 1930s. Here is a heresy: What if there was a shortage of talent brought on by declarations of class warfare?

Another challenge to the Depression economy was tax increases. While these increases didn’t achieve the social equality at which they aimed, they did significant damage by confiscating too much individual and corporate property. As a result, many individuals and businesses simply reduced or halted production— especially as the New Deal wore on. In the late 1930s, banker Leonard Ayres of the Cleveland Trust Company said in the New York Times: “For nearly a decade now the great majority of corporations have been losing money instead of making it.”

As for big labor, the Wagner Act of 1935 proved to be quite destructive. It brought on drastic changes at factories, including the closed shop—the exclusion of non-union members. Another innovation it helped bring about was the sit-down strike, which threatened the basic property right of factory owners to close their doors. Most importantly, it gave unions the power to demand higher wages—and they did. A wage chart for the 20th century shows that real wages in the 1930s were higher than the trend for the rest of the century. This seems perverse, considering the economic conditions at the time. The result was high paying jobs for a few and high unemployment for everyone else. The reality of overpriced labor can be seen in several stock phrases coming out of the Great Depression—“ Nice work if you can get it,” for example, was the refrain of a Gershwin song performed by Fred Astaire in The Damsel in Distress, a film released in 1937 at the zenith of union power.

To return to the Monopoly board metaphor, the problem in the 1930s was not that there was no bank. It was that  there was too much bank—in the form of the federal government. The government took an arbitrary approach to the money supply and made itself the most powerful player. It shoved everyone else aside so that it could monopolize the board. Benjamin Anderson, a Chase economist at the time, summed it up in a book about the period: “Preceding chapters have explained the Great Depression of 1930 to 1939 as due to the efforts of the governments and very especially the government of the United States to play god.”

Relevance for Today

It is not hard to see some of today’s troubles as a repeat of the errors of the 1930s. There is arrogance up top. The federal government is dilettantish with money and exhibits disregard and even hostility to all other players. It is only as a result of this that economic recovery seems out of reach.

The key to recovery, now as in the 1930s, is to be found in property rights. These rights suffer under our current politics in several ways. The mortgage crisis, for example, arose out of a long-standing erosion of the property rights concept—first on the part of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but also on that of the Federal Reserve. Broadening FDR’s entitlement theories, Congress taught the country that home ownership was a “right.” This fostered a misunderstanding of what property is. The owners didn’t realize what ownership entailed—that is, they didn’t grasp that they were obligated to deliver on the terms of the contract of their mortgage. In the bipartisan enthusiasm for making everyone an owner, our government debased the concept of home ownership.

Property rights are endangered as well by the ongoing assault on contracts generally. A perfect example of this was the treatment of Chrysler bonds during the company’s bankruptcy, where senior secured creditors were ignored, notwithstanding the status of their bonds under bankruptcy law. The current administration made a political decision to subordinate those contracts to union demands. That sent a dangerous signal for the future that U.S. bonds are not trustworthy.

Three other threats to property loom. One is tax increases, such as the coming expiration of the Bush tax cuts. More taxes mean less private property. A second threat is in the area of infrastructure. Stimulus plans tend to emphasize infrastructure— especially roads and railroads. And after the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision of 2005, the federal government will have enormous license to use eminent domain to claim private property for these purposes. Third and finally, there is the worst kind of confiscation of private property: inflation, which excessive government spending necessarily encourages. Many of us sense that inflation is closer than the country thinks.

If the experience of the Great Depression teaches anything, it is that property rights must be firmly established or else we will not have the kind of economic activity that leads to strong recovery. The Monopoly board game reminds us that economic growth isn’t mysterious and inscrutable. Economic growth depends on the impulse of the small businessman and entrepreneur to get back in the game. In order for this to happen, we don’t need a perfect government. All we need is one that is “not too bad,” whose rules are not constantly changing and snuffing out the willingness of these players to take risks. We need a government under which the money supply doesn’t change unpredictably, there are not too many “Go to Jail” cards, and the top hats are confident in the possibility of seeing significant returns on investment.

Recovery won’t happen from the top. But when those at the top step back and create the proper conditions, it will happen down there on the board—one house at a time.

Reprinted by permission from Imprimis, a publication of Hillsdale College.

“All men seek happiness. This is without exception. Whatever different means they employ, they all tend to this end. The cause of some going to war, and of others avoiding it, is the same desire in both, attended with different views. The will never takes the least step but to this object. This is the motive of every action of every man, even of those who hang themselves.”

- Blaise Pascal (1623-1662)

In fact, one financial planning firm took a poll of its clients, asking them what kinds of fun things they had rediscovered while they were tightening their belts.  What they found was that many people were having MORE fun with less money, simply by being creative.

Other advisors are asking similar questions, and reporting the answers so that everybody can see what their friends and neighbors have discovered/rediscovered.  They received answers like: working jigsaw puzzles as a family, or playing board games (like Parcheesi or Scrabble) in the evening, inviting friends over to play cards, taking walks, creating a new flower garden (or, in one case, turning the entire front lawn into a flower garden of spectacular beauty), hiking in the local state park, attending a variety of free seminars, getting more involved in community meetings, having group cookouts where everybody shares the cooking or brings dishes, joining a book club–the original advisory firm now has several hundred suggestions, and counting.

Of course, the lesson is something that we somehow manage to forget from time to time: that the world is full of endless possibilities for fun and pleasure and satisfaction and beauty, and some of the most interesting cost us nothing.  In fact, the shared togetherness of many of the “rediscovered” activities makes them superior to how many people were spending their time before the market dropped.

It would be shame if we learned these important lessons and then let our rediscoveries slip away now that people are feeling a bit wealthier again.  They call these the “simple” pleasures, but there’s nothing simple about being creative and really looking at the beauty and possibilities of the world around us.  It’s possible that we can be thriftier AND enjoy life more if we use our minds and hearts and each other to bring pleasure and fun into our lives.

So, I would like to continue the flow of information and ask you, “What have you ‘rediscovered’ as a way to have fun in a more economical fashion?” Why don’t you respond in the comments section below and share your findings with our other readers?

SUMMARY: “The Great Recession is over,” according to NABE’s latest survey. “The survey found that the vast majority of business economists believe that the recession has ended but that the economic recovery is likely to be more moderate than those typically experienced following steep declines. The NABE panel upgraded the economic outlook for the next several quarters, compared with the previous survey,”said NABE President-elect Lynn Reaser, chief economist at Point Loma Nazarene University. “Following a sharp 6.4 percent (annual rate) contraction in the first quarter of this year and another 0.7 percent drop in the second quarter, NABE forecasters expect real GDP to rise at an above trend 2.9 percent rate in the second half. The more-than-three-year downturn in the housing market is very close to coming to an end, with substantial growth (from a low base) expected for next year. According to the survey, the key areas of concern involve the large increases in federal debt and unemployment rates that are expected to remain very high through next year. The unemployment rate is forecast to rise to 10 percent in the first quarter of next year and edge down to 9.5 percent by the end of 2010. Inflation is expected to remain contained throughout 2010. The good news is that this deep and long recession appears to be over, and with improving credit markets, the U.S. economy can return to solid growth next year without worry about rising inflation.”

The Treasury Department’s bank investments are paying dividends. But saying they have earned $6 billion for taxpayers, as Tim Geithner did, is a stretch.

Geithner said this past weekend that taxpayers have made a small profit on their investments in banks via the Troubled Asset Relief Program. “We’ve already earned about $6 billion for the taxpayer on those investments,” Geithner said Sunday on ABC’s “This Week.”

The claim seems to reflect regular payments banks have made since Treasury rolled out the TARP last fall.

Treasury didn’t return a request for comment, but the agency had received $6.85 billion in bank dividend and interest payments through June…

For the rest of the story…

TARP profit claim bugs skeptics – Aug. 4, 2009

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HISTORICAL stock charts seem to show that it took more than 25 years for the market to recover from the 1929 crash — a dismal statistic that has been brought to investors’ attention many times in the current downturn.

But a careful analysis of the record shows that the picture is more complex and, ultimately, far less daunting…

For the full story…

New York Times