BOSTON — When it comes to retirement, the average American age 65 and older generates nearly two-thirds of their total income from a combination of earned income and Social Security, with the rest coming from pensions and personal assets.

But despite the fact that millions are earning income and collecting at the same time, there’s still plenty of confusion over how Uncle Sam goes about taxing and reducing Social Security benefits for workers. Consider, for instance, some of the reasons why it can be confusing:

First, if you retire before the normal retirement age and start collecting Social Security benefits early, your benefits are reduced not only for starting early, but also as your earnings rise. In fact, if you work and collect before the so-called full retirement age, you’ll lose $1 of Social Security benefit for every $2 earned over $14,160 in 2011.

Second, in the year that you reach full retirement age, your benefits are reduced $1 for every $3 earned over $37,680 in 2011, or least that’s the case until the month you reach full retirement age.

Finally, once you’re at full retirement age, your benefits are not reduced, but as much as 85% of the benefits could be taxed if your income is above a certain amount.

According to the Social Security website, if you file a federal tax return as an individual and your combined income is between $25,000 and $34,000, you may have to pay income tax on up to 50% of your benefits. And if your combined income is more than $34,000, up to 85% of your benefits may be taxable. If you file a joint return, and you and your spouse have a combined income that is between $32,000 and $44,000, you may have to pay income tax on up to 50% of your benefits. And if your combined income is more than $44,000, up to 85% of your benefits may be taxable. If you are married and file a separate tax return, you probably will pay taxes on your benefits.

Even though all this might be confusing, there are some ways to increase your after-tax income from all your sources of income — be it earned income, Social Security, dividends, interest income, capital gains, pension income and the like. What’s more, there are some ways to think differently about the interaction between earned income and Social Security benefits.

At a recent MarketWatch roundtable discussion, two of the nations’ top retirement-planning experts offered tactics to consider to when deciding whether and how much to work in retirement, as well as whether and when to start taking Social Security benefits.

Read more: How to Collect Social Security and Keep Working

Dealing With US Debt

If you want to watch something alarming, look at the U.S. Debt Clock (http://www.usdebtclock.org/), which calculates, second-by-second, America’s rising debt (approaching $14 trillion), federal spending (nearly $3.5 trillion a year) and budget deficit (roughly $1.3 trillion).  Second-by-second the numbers increase, and you can also watch (more slowly) the inexorable rise in the average debt per U.S. citizen — currently more than $44,000 — perhaps more by the time you read this and check for yourself.

The Debt Clock also lists the largest budget items and THEIR growth, and you can quickly see that they are not where most of the politicians have focused their attention and public statements.  While incoming Congressional leaders talk about ending earmarks and cutting foreign aid, the back-breaking line items on the federal budget are Medicare/Medicaid, Social Security, Defense and war expenditures.  At the bottom of the Debt Clock screen are some truly frightening statistics: add up all the future unfunded liabilities for Social Security, the federal prescription drug program and Medicare liability, and you get a future cost of $111.5 trillion.  That’s a little over $1 million per taxpayer.

Painful Debt Choices

Like any debtor who gets in over his head, the U.S. Congress faces painful choices.  They can either make very difficult decisions now — and possibly alienate voters — or kick the can further down the road and leave a bankrupt country or crushing debt for our children or grandchildren to pay.  The problem is great enough that a coalition of the very rich, including Bill Gates and Warren Buffet, are doing something unheard of: they are publicly arguing that Congress should end the tax cuts for them and others of the wealthiest Americans.

Is there a way to get both political parties talking about the hard choices?  On December 1, a bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, made up of 18 prominent Republican and Democratic leaders, released “The Moment of Truth,” a set of recommendations that would, if enacted, achieve a $4 trillion reduction in government debt.  The group includes the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Budget committees, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, a former White House budget director and a vice chairman of the Federal reserve board.  To achieve their deficit reduction goals, the commissioners put everything on the table — Social Security, Medicare, tax rates, government spending, even the elimination of popular tax deductions.

The Moment of Truth

You can read the full 49-page report here: The Moment of Truth.  The report lists, on page 10, some of the considerations that went into the decisions, which you may or may not agree with: “We all have a patriotic duty to make America better off tomorrow than it is today;” “Don’t disrupt the fragile economic recovery;” “Cut spending we cannot afford — no exceptions;” “Demand productivity and effectiveness from Washington;” “Don’t make promises we can’t keep;” “Keep America sound over the long run.”

The plan would cut government discretionary spending and impose spending caps, including annual limits on war spending, impose 15% reductions in Congressional and White House budgets, a three-year freeze on annual Congressional pay raises, and eliminate all Congressional earmarks (9,000 in FY 2010, costing close to $16 billion).

The commission also recommends lowering tax rates and eliminating many deductions.  There are actually several alternatives in the final proposal (pages 25-27), depending on which deductions are eliminated.  One possible plan is to bring us down to three tax brackets of 12%, 22% and 28% — replacing five brackets ranging from 15% to 39.6% that is due to take effect in 2011.  Corporations would pay at a flat rate somewhere between 23% and 28%, and lose most of their special subsidies and tax loopholes.

To get there, the Commission proposes that Congress eliminate all itemized deductions (everybody would take the standard deduction) and replace today’s mortgage interest deduction with a 12% tax credit for mortgage loans up to $500,000.  Capital gains and dividends would be taxed at ordinary income rates (rather than the preferential rates under current law) and the dreaded AMT would be eliminated altogether.

More controversially, charitable donations, which are currently deductible for itemizers, would only qualify for a 12% tax credit, and only then to the extent that the gift exceeded 2% of a taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.  The Commission also proposed replacing the current melange of retirement plans (Roths, IRAs, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, defined benefit plans etc.) with one type of tax-favored retirement account for everybody; the maximum tax-preferred contribution would be $20,000 or 20% of income, whichever is lower.

The commission proposes to raise the age at which you could receive full Social Security benefits by indexing it to life expectancy.  The Normal Retirement Age, which reaches 67 in 2027, would go up to age 68 by the year 2050, and 69 by 2075.  The Early Retirement Ages, when people could opt for lower annual benefits, would go up to age 63 by 2050 and 64 by 2075.  The taxable maximum wage cap on Social Security taxes, currently $106,800, would grow more rapidly than it has in the past, reaching $190,000 in 2020, versus roughly $168,000 under current law.

Finally, the current federal gas tax would be increased by 15 cents per gallon, a figure which is still significantly lower than most European countries.  Among a variety of Medicare reforms, the Medicare physician payment formula would be changed to reward quality of care and outcomes, rather than the quantity of visits or procedures.  And the government’s civilian workforce would gradually be cut by ten percent.

The Vote

If 14 of the 18 members of the Commission had voted to endorse the recommendations, then the full report would have been sent to Congress for a vote.  As it is, only 11 endorsed their own recommendations.

Endorsing: Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-IL); Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad (D-ND); House Budget Committee Chairman John Spratt (D-SC); former Federal Reserve Board vice chairwoman Alice Rivlin, Republican Senators Tom Coburn (OK); Mike Crapo (ID) and Judd Gregg (NH), plus Ann Fudge of Young & Rubicam, and Dave Cote of Honeywell International.  Co-chairs Erskine Bowles (former Clinton White House Chief of Staff) and former Republican Senator Alan Simpson also voted for the proposal.

Opposed: Senate Finance Committee chair Max Baucus (D-MT); Rep. Xavier Beccera (D-CA); Rep. Jan Schakowski (D-IL); Rep. Dave Camp (R-MI); Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), Rep Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) and Andy Stern of the Service Employees International Union.

Nevertheless, even the dissenting members of the Committee believe it will change the debate in Washington, and focus Congressional attention on the hard choices rather than the easy sound bites.  Let’s hope so for the sake of our children and grandchildren.

Sources:

Market News: http://imarketnews.com/?q=node/23235

Associated Press: Deficit Reduction Committee Issues

Wall Street Journal: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704594804575648503541856136.html

Tax us more: http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/billionaires-buffett-gates-tax-us/story?id=12259003

Votes pro and con: http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/12/03/1955486/debt-commission-majority-endorses.html

The following is adapted from a lecture given at Hillsdale College on February 2, 2010, during a conference on the New Deal co-sponsored by the Center for Constructive Alternatives and the Ludwig von Mises Lecture Series. A version of this lecture was delivered as the Hayek Prize lecture in 2009.

The Monopoly board game originated during the Great Depression. At first its inventor, Charles Darrow, could not interest manufacturers. Parker Brothers turned the game down, citing “52 design errors.” But Darrow produced his own copies of the game, and Parker Brothers finally bought Monopoly. By 1935, the New York Times was reporting that “leading all other board games … is the season’s craze, ‘Monopoly,’ the game of real estate.”

Most of us are familiar with the object of Monopoly: the accumulation of property on which one places houses and hotels, and from which one receives revenue. Many of us have a favorite token. Perennially popular is the top hat, which symbolizes the sort of wealth to which Americans who work hard can aspire. The top hat is a token that has remained in the game, even while others have changed over the decades.

One’s willingness to play Monopoly depends on a few conditions—for instance, a predictable number of “Pay Income Tax” cards. These cards are manageable when you know in advance the amount of money printed on them and how many of them are in the deck. It helps, too, that there are a limited and predictable number of “Go to Jail” cards. This is what Frank Knight of the University of Chicago would call a knowable risk, as opposed to an uncertainty. Likewise, there must be a limited and predictable number of “Chance” cards. In other words, there has to be some certainty that property rights are secure and that the risks to property are few in number and can be managed.

The bank must be dependable, too. There is a fixed supply of Monopoly money and the bank is supposed to follow the rules of the game, exercising little or no independent discretion. If players sit down at the Monopoly board only to discover a bank that overreaches or is too unpredictable or discretionary, we all know what happens. They will walk away from the board. There is no game.

Relevance to the 1930s

How is this game relevant to the Great Depression? We all know the traditional narrative of that event: The stock market crash generated an economic Katrina. One in four was unemployed in the first few years. It resulted from a combination of monetary, banking, credit, international, and consumer confidence factors. The terrible thing about it was the duration of a high level of unemployment, which averaged in the mid teens for the entire decade.

The second thing we usually learn is that the Depression was mysterious—a problem that only experts with doctorates could solve. That is why FDR’s floating advisory group—Felix Frankfurter, Frances Perkins, George Warren, Marriner Eccles and Adolf Berle, among others—was sometimes known as a Brain Trust. The mystery had something to do with a shortage of money, we are told, and in the end, only a Brain Trust’s tinkering with the money supply saved us. The corollary to this view is that the government knows more than American business does about economics.

Another common presumption is that cleaning up Wall Street and getting rid of white-collar criminals helped the nation recover. A second is that property rights may still have mattered during the 1930s, but that they mattered less than government- created jobs, shoring up home-owners, and getting the money supply right. A third is that American democracy was threatened by the rise of a potential plutocracy, and that the Wagner Act of 1935—which lent federal support to labor unions—was thus necessary and proper. Fourth and finally, the traditional view of the 1930s is that action by the government was good, whereas inaction would have been fatal. The economic crisis mandated any kind of action, no matter how far removed it might be from sound monetary policy. Along these lines the humorist Will Rogers wrote in 1933 that if Franklin Roosevelt had “burned down the capital, we would cheer and say, ‘Well at least we got a fire started, anyhow.’”

To put this official version of the 1930s in terms of the Monopoly board: The American economy was failing because there were too many top hats lording it about on the board, trying to establish a plutocracy, and because there was no bank to government became the bank and pulled America back to economic health.

When you go to research the 1930s, however, you find a different story. It is of course true that the early part of the Depression—the years upon which most economists have focused—was an economic Katrina. And a number of New Deal measures provided lasting benefits for the economy. These include the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the push for free trade led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and the establishment of the modern mortgage format. But the remaining evidence contradicts the official narrative. Overall, it can be said, government prevented recovery. Herbert Hoover was too active, not too passive—as the old stereotypes suggest— while Roosevelt and his New Deal policies impeded recovery as well, especially during the latter half of the decade.

In short, the prolonged Depression can be put down to government arrogance— arrogance that came at the expense of economic common sense, the rule of law, and respect for property rights.

Arrogance and Discretion

Consider the centerpiece of the New Deal’s first 100 days, the National Recovery Administration (NRA), which was in effect an enormous multisector mechanism calibrated to manage the business cycle through industrial codes that, among other things, regulated prices. The principles on which its codes were based appear risible from the perspective of microeconomics and common sense. They included the idea that prices needed to be pushed up to make recovery possible, whereas competition constrained recovery by driving prices down. They held that big firms in industry— those “too big to fail”—were to write codes for all members of their sector, large and small—which naturally worked to the advantage of those larger firms. As for consumer choice, it was deemed inefficient and an inhibitor of recovery. The absurdity of these principles was overlooked, however, because they were put forth by great minds. One member of the Brain Trust, Ray Moley, described the myopic credentialism of his fellow Brain Truster, Felix Frankfurter, in this way:

The problems of economic life were to Frankfurter matters to be settled in a law office, a court room, or around a big labor-management bargaining table . . . . The government was the protagonist. Its agents were its lawyers and commissioners. The antagonists were big corporate lawyers. In the background were misty principals whom Frankfurter never really knew at first hand . . . . These background figures were owners of the corporations, managers, workers and consumers.

One family that was targeted by NRA bureaucrats was the Schechters, who were wholesale chicken butchers in Brooklyn. The NRA code that aimed to regulate what they did was called The Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area in and about the City of New York. And according to this code, the Schechters did all the wrong things. They paid their butchers too little. They charged prices that were too low. They allowed their customers to pick their own chickens. Worst of all, they sold a sick chicken. As a result of these supposed crimes, they were prosecuted.

The prosecution would have been comic if it were not business tragedy. Imagine the court room scene: On one side stands Walter Lyman Rice, a graduate of Harvard Law School, representing the government. On the other stands a small man in the poultry trade, Louis Spatz, who is afraid of going to jail. Spatz tries to defend his actions. But he barely speaks English, and the prosecutor bullies him. Nevertheless, Spatz is now and then able to articulate, in his simple and common-sense way, how business really works.

Prosecution: But you do not claim to be an expert?
Spatz: No.
Prosecution: On the competitive practices in the live poultry industry?
Spatz: I would want to get paid, if I was an expert.
Prosecution: You are not an expert!
Spatz: I am experienced, but not an expert . . . .
Prosecution: You have not studied agricultural economics?
Spatz: No, sir.
Prosecution: Or any sort of economics?
Spatz: No, sir.
Prosecution: What is your education?
Spatz: None; very little.
Prosecution: None at all?
Spatz: Very little.

Then at one point this everyman sort of pulls himself together.

Prosecution: And you would not endeavor to explain economic consequences of competitive practices?
Spatz: In my business I am the best economist.
Prosecution: What is that?
Spatz: In my business I am the best economizer.
Prosecution: You are the best economizer?
Spatz: Yes, without figuring.
Prosecution: I wish to have that word spelled in the minutes, just as he stated it.
Spatz: I do not know how to spell.

This dialogue matters because little businesses like Schechter Poultry are the natural drivers of recovery, and during the Great Depression they weren’t allowed to do that driving. They weren’t allowed to compete and accumulate wealth—or, in terms of Monopoly, to place a house or hotel on their property. Instead they were sidelined. The Schechter brothers ultimately won their case in the Supreme Court in 1935. But the cost of the lawsuits combined with the Depression did not go away.

Regarding monetary policy, it is clear that there wasn’t enough money in the early 1930s. So Roosevelt was not wrong in trying to reflate. But though his general idea was right, the discretionary aspect of his policy was terrifying. As Henry Morgenthau reports in his diaries, prices were set by the president personally. FDR took the U.S. off the gold standard in April 1933, and by summer he was setting the gold price every morning from his bed. Morgenthau reports that at one point the president ordered the gold price up 21 cents. Why 21, Morgenthau asked. Roosevelt replied, because it’s 3 x 7, and three is a lucky number. “If anyone knew how we set the gold price,” wrote Morgenthau in his diary, “they would be frightened.”

Discretionary policies aimed at cleaning up Wall Street were destructive as well. The New Dealers attacked the wealthy as “money changers” and “Princes of Property.” In 1937, after his re-election, Roosevelt delivered an inaugural address an instrument of “unimagined power” which should be used to “fashion a higher order of things.” This caused business to freeze in its tracks. Companies went on what Roosevelt himself resentfully termed a “capital strike.”

These capital strikers mattered because they were even more important to recovery than the Schechters. Consider the case of Alfred Lee Loomis, who had the kind of mind that could contribute significantly to Gross Domestic Product and job creation. During the First World War, he had improved the design of firearms for the U.S. Army. In the 1920s, he became wealthy through his work in investment banking. He moved in a crowd that was developing a new form of utility company that might finally be able to marshal the capital to bring electricity to the American South. But when Loomis saw that the Roosevelt administration was hauling utilities executives down to Washington for hearings, he shut down his business, retreated to his Tudor house, and ran a kind of private think tank for his own benefit. We have heard a lot about a labor surfeit in the 1930s. Here is a heresy: What if there was a shortage of talent brought on by declarations of class warfare?

Another challenge to the Depression economy was tax increases. While these increases didn’t achieve the social equality at which they aimed, they did significant damage by confiscating too much individual and corporate property. As a result, many individuals and businesses simply reduced or halted production— especially as the New Deal wore on. In the late 1930s, banker Leonard Ayres of the Cleveland Trust Company said in the New York Times: “For nearly a decade now the great majority of corporations have been losing money instead of making it.”

As for big labor, the Wagner Act of 1935 proved to be quite destructive. It brought on drastic changes at factories, including the closed shop—the exclusion of non-union members. Another innovation it helped bring about was the sit-down strike, which threatened the basic property right of factory owners to close their doors. Most importantly, it gave unions the power to demand higher wages—and they did. A wage chart for the 20th century shows that real wages in the 1930s were higher than the trend for the rest of the century. This seems perverse, considering the economic conditions at the time. The result was high paying jobs for a few and high unemployment for everyone else. The reality of overpriced labor can be seen in several stock phrases coming out of the Great Depression—“ Nice work if you can get it,” for example, was the refrain of a Gershwin song performed by Fred Astaire in The Damsel in Distress, a film released in 1937 at the zenith of union power.

To return to the Monopoly board metaphor, the problem in the 1930s was not that there was no bank. It was that  there was too much bank—in the form of the federal government. The government took an arbitrary approach to the money supply and made itself the most powerful player. It shoved everyone else aside so that it could monopolize the board. Benjamin Anderson, a Chase economist at the time, summed it up in a book about the period: “Preceding chapters have explained the Great Depression of 1930 to 1939 as due to the efforts of the governments and very especially the government of the United States to play god.”

Relevance for Today

It is not hard to see some of today’s troubles as a repeat of the errors of the 1930s. There is arrogance up top. The federal government is dilettantish with money and exhibits disregard and even hostility to all other players. It is only as a result of this that economic recovery seems out of reach.

The key to recovery, now as in the 1930s, is to be found in property rights. These rights suffer under our current politics in several ways. The mortgage crisis, for example, arose out of a long-standing erosion of the property rights concept—first on the part of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but also on that of the Federal Reserve. Broadening FDR’s entitlement theories, Congress taught the country that home ownership was a “right.” This fostered a misunderstanding of what property is. The owners didn’t realize what ownership entailed—that is, they didn’t grasp that they were obligated to deliver on the terms of the contract of their mortgage. In the bipartisan enthusiasm for making everyone an owner, our government debased the concept of home ownership.

Property rights are endangered as well by the ongoing assault on contracts generally. A perfect example of this was the treatment of Chrysler bonds during the company’s bankruptcy, where senior secured creditors were ignored, notwithstanding the status of their bonds under bankruptcy law. The current administration made a political decision to subordinate those contracts to union demands. That sent a dangerous signal for the future that U.S. bonds are not trustworthy.

Three other threats to property loom. One is tax increases, such as the coming expiration of the Bush tax cuts. More taxes mean less private property. A second threat is in the area of infrastructure. Stimulus plans tend to emphasize infrastructure— especially roads and railroads. And after the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision of 2005, the federal government will have enormous license to use eminent domain to claim private property for these purposes. Third and finally, there is the worst kind of confiscation of private property: inflation, which excessive government spending necessarily encourages. Many of us sense that inflation is closer than the country thinks.

If the experience of the Great Depression teaches anything, it is that property rights must be firmly established or else we will not have the kind of economic activity that leads to strong recovery. The Monopoly board game reminds us that economic growth isn’t mysterious and inscrutable. Economic growth depends on the impulse of the small businessman and entrepreneur to get back in the game. In order for this to happen, we don’t need a perfect government. All we need is one that is “not too bad,” whose rules are not constantly changing and snuffing out the willingness of these players to take risks. We need a government under which the money supply doesn’t change unpredictably, there are not too many “Go to Jail” cards, and the top hats are confident in the possibility of seeing significant returns on investment.

Recovery won’t happen from the top. But when those at the top step back and create the proper conditions, it will happen down there on the board—one house at a time.

Reprinted by permission from Imprimis, a publication of Hillsdale College.

Retirement Dollar

The need for retirement planning doesn’t end with the onset of retirement. A new retiree’s focus shifts from building wealth to managing and preserving it. One major challenge is to make the investment portfolio supply cash flow for the duration of life—and through different economic and market conditions.

Experts have studied portfolio longevity or endurance to help retired investors reduce the odds of depleting their wealth too soon. The studies evaluate how a portfolio might endure under the stress of changing markets and spending levels. The resulting models estimate portfolio survival in terms of statistical probabilities.1 While the technical details are beyond the scope of this article, the general conclusions are more intuitive.

Three main factors drive portfolio endurance: asset mix, spending level, and investment time frame. Certain aspects of these factors are within an investor’s control while others are not. Let’s briefly consider them.

Asset Mix for Retirement

Asset mix describes the ratio of stocks to bonds in a portfolio. This determines risk exposure and expected performance, and is one of the most important decisions investors of all ages can make. Historically, stocks have outperformed bonds and outpaced inflation over time. This return premium reflects the higher risk of owning stocks.2 Consequently, the larger the equity allocation, the greater a portfolio’s expected return—and risk.

Keep in mind that risk and return go together. A higher allocation to equities increases the risk of experiencing periods of poor returns during retirement. But if you can handle the risk, having more equity exposure in a portfolio enhances its return potential. Growth can bring higher cash flow, inflation protection, and portfolio endurance over time. This is why most advisors believe that most investors should have an equity component in their portfolios, with actual weighting depending on one’s time frame, risk tolerance, and spending flexibility.

Spending Level During Retirement

Portfolio withdrawal is typically described in terms of a specified dollar amount (e.g., $50,000 per year) or a percent of annual portfolio value (e.g., 5% of assets each year). Neither method is ideal, however—and for different reasons. Briefly consider each one:

•    Specified dollar amount:  withdrawing a fixed amount each year and adjusting it for inflation can provide a stable income stream and preserve your living standard over time. But the portfolio may survive only if future withdrawals represent a small proportion of the portfolio’s value. One academic study quantified this amount. It found that a retiree with at least a 60% stock allocation can withdraw up to 4% of initial portfolio value (adjusted for inflation each year), and enjoy a high probability of never running out of wealth.3 Choosing a higher withdrawal amount is not likely to be sustainable, especially if the portfolio faces an extended period of negative returns.

•    Percent of annual portfolio value: withdrawing a fixed percentage of assets based on annual asset value makes it unlikely that you will deplete retirement assets because a sudden drop in market value would be accompanied by a proportional decline in spending. But this method can produce wide swings in your living standard when investment returns are volatile.

Retirees who need relatively consistent cash flow may want to combine these two methods. One way is to withdraw cash flow according to a rule that combines past spending (e.g., an average of the past thirty-six months of cash flow) with a payout rate applied to current portfolio value. You can weight these factors to favor your preference for either more stable cash flow or a greater chance of portfolio survival. In effect, you are customizing your withdrawals to smooth out consumption while responding to actual investment performance.

Investment Time Frame for Retirement

Investment time horizon may be the hardest to estimate, especially if it is the same as your lifespan. In this case, you can only guess how long your portfolio must support spending. If you plan to bequeath assets, your investment time frame may extend beyond your lifetime. This may influence your risk and spending decisions as well.

Time frame forces a tradeoff between the short and long term. Retirees with a longer investment time horizon might choose a higher exposure to equities. But they may have to offset this risk by being more flexible about spending over time. Elderly retirees and others with a short time horizon may choose a less risky allocation or a higher payout rate, although they can experience rising spending levels, too. In any case, retirees should think carefully about equity exposure and avoid taking more risk than they can afford.

Considerations During Retirement

Planning involves assumptions about the future—assumptions that may not pan out. Although you cannot avoid making assumptions, you can ask whether they are realistic and consider how your lifestyle might change if future economic and financial conditions are much different than projected. For instance, you may assume an average return based on historical performance. But there is no certainty that future portfolio returns will resemble the past, regardless of time frame. Moreover, short-term results may vary drastically, which could force hard financial choices. Investors should think in terms of probability, not history.

Managing asset mix, payout, and time horizon inevitably involves tradeoffs. Exhibit 1 below illustrates the dynamics. For example, a bond-dominated portfolio with a lower expected return may suit investors with a shorter time horizon, or require them to accept a lower payout rate to increase the odds of portfolio survival. A portfolio with a higher allocation to equities may be appropriate for someone with a long time horizon or a strong desire for a high payout rate, but a higher assumption of risk also results in greater uncertainty about future wealth. Retirees who take this route must be able to handle the risk emotionally, and they should be ready to adjust their lifestyle in response to market downturns. In fact, investor flexibility plays a role in all of the tradeoffs.

Basic Trade-offs in Portfolio Survival

Finally, although you cannot fully control these and other factors involved in portfolio endurance in retirement, having more wealth can improve the odds of having a less stressful financial life. A more substantial nest egg might enable you to take fewer risks, enjoy a higher sustainable spending rate, or extend the productive life of your portfolio during retirement.

__________________________________________

Endnotes:
1 Cooley, Philip L., Carl M. Hubbard, and Daniel T. Walz. 1998. “Retirement Savings: Choosing a Withdrawal Rate That Is Sustainable,” AAII Journal 20: 16–21. Also see: Bengen, William P.  1994. “Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical Data,” Journal of Financial Planning 7: 171.

2 From 1926 to 2009, the S&P 500 Index returned an average 9.8% per year compared to 5.4% for long-term government bonds and 3.0% inflation. Sources: Standard & Poor’s Index Services Group for S&P 500 Index; long-term government bonds and inflation provided by Stocks, Bonds, Bill, and Inflation Yearbook™, Ibbotson Associates.

3 Cooley, Hubbard, and Walz, Retirement Savings: Choosing a Withdrawal Rate That Is Sustainable,” 16–21.

This article was provided by Dimensional Fund Advisors. Dimensional Fund Advisors is an investment advisor registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This material is provided for informational and educational purposes only. It should not be considered investment advice or an offer to buy or sell securities.

Planning allocations between entities and beneficiaries is even more critical with higher tax rates on the horizon.

By Sonja Pippin, Ph.D. – Journal of Accountancy

New tax laws will have a significant impact on the taxation of trusts. If you, or someone you know, is acting as trustee to an irrevocable trust, then you need to pay attention to this article.

Estates and nongrantor trusts must file income tax returns just as individuals do, but with some important differences. For one, their income is taxed at either the entity or beneficiary level depending on whether it is allocated to principal or allocated to distributable income, and whether it is distributed to the beneficiaries. And because their exemption amounts, tax brackets and related thresholds haven’t been indexed for inflation or modified for tax relief to the extent those for individuals have, they can be subject to higher tax rates at much lower levels of income. With the new Medicare tax on investment income on the highest tax brackets, estates and trusts pay still more taxes on incomes over $11,200, as opposed to $200,000 or $250,000 for individuals.

In this and other ways, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation acts of 2010 (PL 111-148 and PL 111-152, respectively) affect trusts’ and estates’ income taxes and have introduced discrepancies that tax practitioners can review with their clients who administer trusts and estates. This article reviews some strategies for more tax-efficient allocation of income and principal by trusts and estates.

For the complete article, go to Income Tax Accounting for Trusts and Estates in the Journal of Accountancy

Navigating Structured Products

by Brian Harris, Senior Editor, Dimensional Fund Advisors

In recent years, structured products have gained favor among retail investors in Europe and the US. Investment banks promote these securities as sophisticated tools to help investors manage downside risk, enhance returns, or achieve other investment objectives.

Sales have grown briskly since 2006, and despite a decline after the 2008 market crisis, some industry sources expect a rebound in sales and a flurry of new products in the future.1 With this in mind, it may be useful to understand how the products work and to evaluate the costs, benefits, and tradeoffs before considering one in your investment strategy.

Basic design of structured products

A structured product is a contract that promises to pay a future amount based on the performance of an underlying asset, such as a stock, market index, or commodity. The payoff is typically linked to a preset formula. Most structured products are designed to either preserve capital or enhance returns, and are typically issued as notes.2 The notes offer a specific payout over a designated period or at maturity, and the final payout depends on the performance of the underlying asset as well as the value of the derivatives written on it. Since the product typically is issued by an investment bank, the investor is exposed to the credit risk of that entity.

One common product, a principal-protected note, generally offers a minimum return equal to the original investment, plus a potential return tied to performance of an underlying asset, such as a stock market index. If the index drops during the term, the investor gets his money back, but if the index rises, he may receive the upside gain, but usually only a part of the underlying asset’s gain. Structured products can be replicated by portfolios composed of an interest-bearing instrument, such as a certificate of deposit or zero-coupon bond, equity securities, and options or other derivative securities whose performance is linked to the underlying index.3

The following summarizes a few common characteristics of structured products:

•    Complex design: Most products have a complex design, which can make analysis of pricing, risk exposure, and potential outcomes more difficult. Some investors equate this complexity with higher potential returns, when, in fact, it may only mask high fees and risk. Worse yet, investors may not understand the range of possible outcomes. During the 2008 market crisis, some investors learned a hard lesson when the issuing firm went bankrupt or when their structured product experienced losses from poor performance of the underlying asset.

•    Substantial cost: These products tend to carry a significant markup and costs that in some cases are difficult to quantify, especially if an investor lacks the technical knowledge to analyze the underlying components of the strategy.

•    Replication: The payoff of virtually any structured product can be replicated in a portfolio by holding the underlying securities, then buying or selling derivatives written on those securities. In many cases, the costs associated with the replication portfolio are much lower than the structured product itself.

•  Tradeoffs: In return for receiving a prescribed payout, investors must accept a tradeoff in the form of a lower return and/or limited upside potential. When evaluating a structured payout, remember that there is no free lunch in the risk-return tradeoff. To pursue higher expected returns, you must accept more risk. If you do not want to bear the risk, you must transfer it to other investors and pay them for taking it.

•    Multiple Risks: First, there are the inherent risks of the underlying security (e.g., the stock or index). Investors also are exposed to credit risk of the issuing firm. The contract is an agreement with the issuer to make a pre-determined payment in the future, and thus, it is contingent on the firm being able to deliver. Liquidity risk is another issue. Although many structured products are listed and traded on exchanges, they may be difficult to sell, especially in a volatile market. To avoid a potential liquidity problem, investors should consider the time horizon of the product and attempt to match its maturity to their anticipated financial need or objective.

• Tax considerations: It is also important to check tax consequences. Some instruments may have certain appeal under the current tax rule. But, often, tax consequences differ according to the investment situation (e.g., whether one buys at the issuance or in the secondary market).

Who might benefit?
A structured product might help an investor who needs a specific payout at a designated point in the future and who is willing to pay another party to shoulder much of the uncertainty. But this benefit generally comes at the expense of lower yield or limited upside potential.

One example may be an individual who currently holds restricted company stock whose value may account for a significant portion of his total wealth. Although he might prefer to diversify this exposure, company rules may prohibit a sale until some future date. A structured product might provide protection against the downside risk of the company’s stock (even though this might mean giving up the upside potential of the stock), and at the same time, provide better-diversified exposure to an equity index, such as the S&P 500.

Perhaps most important, investors who are considering a structured product should consider why they even need a highly structured payoff in the future—and if so, whether the payoff can be structured by other means in the portfolio. In many cases, the strategy can be replicated at a lower cost, and perhaps with less risk. Many investors would prefer an alternative that is less complex and more transparent. And as the recent credit crisis taught many investors, it is wise to avoid investing in things you do not understand.

Endnotes

1 Larry Light, “Twice Shy on Structured Products?” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2009.

2 A reverse convertible bond is one example of a yield enhancement tool. It pays investors a higher coupon rate than other comparable bonds due to its higher risk. This risk comes in the form of the issuer having the option to pay off the debt with either cash or a predetermined number of common stock shares. The method of payment at time of maturity will depend on the stock price, and the issuer will pay with common stock when it is advantageous to do so. The reverse convertible bond was popular until the last market crisis, when many investors experienced heavy losses when they were paid off with lower-value stock shares.

3 A call option provides the holder the right to buy the underlying security at a given price at a certain time in the future. A put option provides the holder with rights to sell the underlying security at a pre-specified price on maturity date. (American-style options can be exercised before the maturity date, whereas European-style options can be exercised only on the maturity date.) An option holder will exercise the put or call option only if the payoff is positive.

Dimensional Fund Advisors is an investment advisor registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This material on structured products is provided for informational and educational purposes only and should not be considered investment advice or an offer to buy or sell securities.

The following article from Investor’s News is an eye opener. It is so easy to think investing is easy – think again. And, enjoy reading this article and take heed.

Like so many investors in the spring of 2009, Gordon Wolf needed to dig out of a hole.

A 68-year-old psychologist in Napa, California, Wolf was a buy-and-hold sort of guy, yet the nest egg he had entrusted to his broker at Merrill Lynch was suddenly down by more than 50 percent.

The broker had invested much of it in a range of exchange- traded funds, or ETFs, a relatively new financial innovation that was replacing mutual funds in the hearts and portfolios of many investors. An ETF, which can be bought or sold like a stock, attempts to track the price of a particular basket of assets–tech stocks, for instance, or high-yield bonds, or commodities ranging from wheat to gold to oil to natural gas.

The commodity ETFs were supposed to offer a hedge against equity losses, but in the crash of 2008 everything fell in tandem. Now it was early 2009, and Wolf was watching oil fall to $34 a barrel. That had to be an opportunity, he figured, so he called his Merrill broker and asked about the U.S. Oil Fund, an ETF designed to track the price of light, sweet crude. “This seems to be something good,” Wolf told the broker, and had him buy about $10,000 of USO.

What happened next didn’t make sense. Wolf watched oil go up as predicted, yet USO kept going down. In February 2009, for example, crude rose 7.4 percent while USO fell 7.4 percent. What was going on?

For the rest of this article, go to Investors in commodity ETFs getting “eaten alive”

Christianity and Capitalism

by Richard Doster

It’s been a rough couple of years for free-market capitalism.

In Business as a Calling: Work and the Examined Life, theologian Michael Novak wonders if capitalism is “spiritually empty and corrosive of virtue.” The evidence, perhaps now more than at any time in the past 70 years, may tilt the scales in that direction.

In response to the recent turmoil, French president Nicolas Sarkozy has said, “Laissez-faire is finished. The all-powerful market that always knows best is finished.” And the Washington Post has declared, “The worst financial crisis since the Great Depression is claiming another casualty: American-style capitalism.”

Such a negative view of capitalism might perplex those in the Reformed-Calvinist community. According to David Hall and Matthew Burton, authors of Calvin and Commerce: The Transforming Power of Calvinism in Market Economies, it was John Calvin himself who laid the foundation for today’s market-based economy.

As Calvin’s theological heirs we know that economic decisions, like those in every category, stem from a worldview. They reflect our values and fundamental view of man, and while the Bible doesn’t prescribe a particular economic system it does, Hall and Burton tell us, provide a moral framework within which to make our choices. As Christians, our challenge is to recognize and—to the extent we’re able—create the system that fits best with what the Bible teaches.

So, in a fallen world that’s populated by sinful people, what realities should an economic system address? What good should it aspire to? And what truths—about God, man, and money—should be brought to bear? The answers could (and do) fill books. For now we’ll glance at six features of a realistic, healthy economic system.

For the rest of this article go to Can Christians Reclaim Capitalism? in byFaith Magazine.

I am linking you to a short presentation that shows how the VAT works. The most important thing about the VAT that is not underlined in this presentation is the fact that the consumer never actually sees that tax that is embedded in the price of everything he will buy under the VAT regimen. I believe this is why some members of Congress like it so much; no visibility.

First, I believe we should be looking like starving hawks for ways to cut spending rather than raising taxes. But that being said, I also believe in full disclosure. There should be no secrets when it comes to government getting into the pockets of American citizens. The VAT does just the opposite, it attempts to hide the tax from the consumer. Oh yes, I know, anyone willing to look into it carefully can know what is being paid in tax, but the reality is that most won’t do that and everyone will eventually get used to the increase in costs and not realize how much of it is a tax. And, of course, once the VAT is in place, it can be slowly increased and, like the frog in the pot, we won’t realize that we are being boiled alive. As you can tell, I don’t like the VAT. But I promised you a link to a demonstration to how it works, so here it is. How Would a VAT Work?

Recent Market Volatility in Perspective

The US stock market has taken investors on a bumpy ride in recent years. This volatility has tested investor discipline and prompted some people to question their commitment to equities. While no one knows the future, looking at the past may help you gain a better view of long-term market performance and put the recent market volatility in perspective.

The above chart shows the historical distribution of US market returns since 1926. The performance years are stacked in ascending order by return range. This chart illustrates that:

•    Market performance over the past two years has been extreme by historical standards. In 2008, US stocks experienced their second-worst calendar return in eighty-four years. Then, in 2009, stocks rebounded strongly to deliver a return in the top quartile of the historical distribution.

•    Over the long term, the market’s positive return years have outnumbered the negative return years. Since 1926, the market has experienced a positive return in almost three-quarters of the calendar years.

•    Not only are the positive years more numerous, the chart shows a larger concentration of performance in the higher ranges of returns.

•    The sequence of calendar returns appears random, suggesting that accurately predicting future performance is a difficult task for any investor or professional manager.

Over time, the market has rewarded investors who can bear the risk of stocks and stay committed through various periods of performance.

This data was provided by Dimensional Fund Advisors.